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COULD THERE BE MORE THAN ONE LORD? 
T W Bartel 
In this article I defend the Social Trinitarian-someone who maintains that 
the Trinity consists of three distinct divine individuals-against the objection 
that it is metaphysically impossible for each member of a Social Trinity to 
exercise the kind of sovereignty over the created world that traditional theists 
attribute to a divine being. I consider what I take to be the most forceful 
argument for this objection, and construct a reply which, though not conclu-
sive, poses a serious challenge to those who believe that the argument has 
much force against Social Trinitarianism. 
'Let it be admitted,' writes the anonymous author of an eighteenth-century 
Unitarian pamphlet, 'that you had proved the supreme divinity of Christ and 
the Holy Spirit, the natural conclusion would have been three distinct Gods, 
which is a doctrine expressly condemned by Scripture and reason. '1 I agree 
that the 'natural conclusion'-in fact, the only reasonable conclusion-to 
draw from the divinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is that there are three 
distinct divine individuals-a view I shall henceforth call 'the Social Theory 
of the Trinity. '2 But I do not agree that the Social Theory is expressly, or 
implicitly, condemned by Scripture, tradition, or reason. I shall not attempt 
in this paper to demonstrate that Social Trinitarianism can be reconciled with 
Scripture and tradition. 3 Nor shall I try to defuse every objection to the Social 
Theory that can claim any support from reason. But I shall attempt to com-
plete a modest fragment of the task of defending the philosophical plausibility 
of Social Trinitarianism-albeit a fragment that will prove to be of consid-
erable interest not only for Christian philosophers and theologians, but also 
for theists in general, and indeed for anyone who cares about the philosophi-
cal problems of action, causation, states of affairs and their individuation, 
and more. In brief, I shall undertake to defend the Social Theorist against the 
charge that it is impossible for each member of a Social Trinity to exercise 
the kind of sovereignty over the created world that Christians are obliged to 
attribute to God-and so are we forbidden by reason, if not the catholic 
religion, to say, There be three Lords. This charge can be supported by quite 
a forceful argument; so if my defence succeeds, it will enhance the reputation 
of the Social Theory. My examination of this objection will also warn us away 
from a tempting, but fatally flawed, interpretation of Social Trinitarianism, 
and will enable us to state the Social Theory with unprecedented precision. 
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I 
The objection I shall consider epitomises a very common method for trying 
to impugn the coherence of Social Trinitarianism: selecting an attribute that 
is essential for being fully divine and arguing that this attribute is unshare-
able-that is, there is no possible world in which more than one being has 
this attribute. The stock example of such an attribute is omnipotence. Several 
philosophers have recently contended that this property is not unshareable.4 
But there is another divine attribute which has frequently been considered 
un shareable; and to the best of my knowledge, no-one has yet attempted to 
discredit any of the arguments for this opinion. This attribute is sovereignty-
God's control over everything in the created world. I shall set forth the best 
argument I can for the unshareability of divine sovereignty-I will call it 'the 
Causal Argument' -and then construct a reply which, though not conclusive, 
poses a serious challenge to those who believe that this argument has much 
force against the Social Theory of the Trinity. 
The Causal Argument aims to demonstrate that it is impossible for more 
than one being in each possible world to exercise the sort of sovereign control 
over the universe that a being must wield in order to count as divine. This 
argument is at least as old as Scotus, but its best formulation to date can be 
found in a recent article by William Wainwright-and although I shall suggest 
some improvements to this version, my presentation of the argument will 
remain very close to his.5 
We begin with a principle that has a considerable amount of intuitive 
appeal: whenever some state of affairs which obtains at a certain time is 
causally sufficient for an effect, nothing else obtaining at that same time is 
causally necessary for the same effect. Or, more formally: 
1. For any states of affairs x, y, and z and any time t: if x's obtaining at t 
is causally sufficient for y's obtaining, then if z occurs·at t and z is neither 
identical to x nor a proper part of x, z is not causally necessary for the 
obtaining of y.6 
This principle seems to be a necessary truth, and an obvious necessary truth 
at that: it appears to flow irresistibly from the concepts of causal necessity 
and causal sufficiency. If x is causally sufficient for y, then surely, it seems, 
nothing over and above x is needed for y to obtain. Furthermore, 1 can be 
bolstered by examples. Consider a case of simultaneous causal overdetermi-
nation-a case in which a state of affairs has two simultaneous sets of caus-
ally sufficient conditions. Suppose that two independent switches, WI and 
W2, are flipped at exactly the same time and that each of the currents that 
flows down a wire from each switch reaches the filament of a single bulb at 
the same instant, whereupon the bulb lights up. Each of the chains of causes 
leading from one of the switches to the filament is in itself causally sufficient 
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for the lighting of the bulb. And of course neither of these causal chains is 
necessary for the bulb's lighting: if WI had not been turned on but W2 had, 
or vice versa, the light would still have come on. 
The second premise of the Causal Argument expresses an important ele-
ment of the traditional doctrine of divine sovereignty. I will use the term 
'creature' as a convenient synonym for 'non-divine contingent substance'-
an actual non-divine substance that does not exist in every possible world. 
And I will assume-but only for the moment-a volitional theory of divine 
action, according to which every effect that a divine being brings about in 
the created world is caused by that being's willing that effect to obtain. We 
shall notice later that the Causal Argument can easily dispense with this 
assumption, but the argument is more elegant if we retain it. 
Now one of the fundamental components of the traditional conception of 
divine sovereignty is the claim that no creature can exist apart from God's 
creative or sustaining power. In order to formulate this claim precisely, how-
ever, we must remove an ambiguity which can easily infect our talk of divine 
volitions. The scope of the temporal operator in the sentence 
S. x wills the existence of y at t 
may include either the existence of y-so that it should be read as 
S 1. x, at an unspecified time (or in the 'timeless present'), wills the state of 
affairs denoted by 'y's existing at t'-
or the willing of x-which means 
S2. x, at t, wills the existence of y, 
with the time of y's existing left unspecified-or both the existence of y and 
the willing of x, which yields 
S3. x wills at t the state of affairs denoted by 'y's existing at t.' 
I shall use hyphens to indicate that a particular temporal operator applies only 
to the state of affairs that is willed, and not to the willing-thus, 'x wills the 
existence of y-at-t' is equi valent to S I-and I shall indicate the time of x's 
willing (if any) by using 'x's willing at t.' 
We are now prepared to state the second premise of the Causal Argument: 
2. For any x, if x is divine, then for every creature y and time t, if y exists 
at t then x's willing at t (or in the 'timeless present') the existence of 
y-at-t is causally necessary for y's existing-at-t.1 
The third premise of the Causal Argument is more elaborate, and needs some 
prior explanation. This premise is entailed by, though it does not entail, the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo-the claim that God brought the universe into 
being from nothing. One crucial point expressed by this doctrine is that God's 
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productive activity is sufficient to bring the universe into existence: God had 
no need of anything else, such as pre-existing matter, to create our cosmos. 
Some theists go further than this, and maintain that God's activity is sufficient 
for the obtaining of every contingent state of affairs. But of course other 
theists believe that this goes too far-that, for example, such a conception of 
divine activity annihilates human freedom and moral responsibility, since 
God would causally predetermine each human choice. Since this ancient 
controversy shows no sign at present of disappearing, any argument against 
Trinitarianism should resolutely refrain from taking sides on this issue.s For-
tunately for the Causal Argument, it can stay out of this dispute-all it 
requires for its third premise is the principle that the will of a divine being 
is causally sufficient for the existence of at least one creature. That is: 
3. For any x, if x is divine and there exists at least one creature, then there 
exists a creature y and a time t such that x's willing at t the existence of 
y-at-t is causally sufficient for the existence of y at t. 
We shall need a concise term for the attribute which 2 and 3 taken together 
ascribe to a divine being-it will not quite do to call it the property of being 
such that one s activity is causally necessary for the existence of every crea-
ture and causally sufficient for the existence of at least one creature. And 
although the conjunction of 2 and 3 does not exhaust the content of the 
traditional doctrine of divine sovereignty, I should still think it appropriate 
to call this attribute 'sovereignty,' so that any being who satisfies both 2 and 
3 is sovereign. 
Now if 1, 2, and 3 are all true, the Causal Argument needs only one more 
premise in order to demonstrate that the Social Theory of the Trinity is 
incoherent: 
4. For any agents x and y, if x is not identical to y, then no act-token 
performed by x is identical with any act-token performed by y. 
In other words, two act-tokens are identical only if they involve the same agent. 
For suppose that the Social Theory is true. Then, given what else we know, 
5. The Father is divine, the Son is divine, the Father is not the same agent 
as the Son, and there is at least one creature. 
And 3 and 5 jointly entail 
6. At some time t, there exists a creature c such that God the Father's 
willing at t the existence of c-at-t (call this act-token 'I) is causally 
sufficient for the existence of c at t. 
Moreover, 2 and 5 jointly entail 
7. God the Son's willing at t the existence of c-at-t (call this act-token 's') 
is causally necessary for the existence of c at t. 
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But it follows from 4 and 5 that 
8. fis not identical to s. 
And it follows from 1, 6, and 8 that 
9. s is not causally necessary for the existence of c at t, 
which of course contradicts 7. 
Since the truth of 1-4 is incompatible with the Social Theory of the Trinity, 
Social Trinitarians are obliged to find some reason for rejecting, or at least 
doubting, one of the premises of the Causal Argument. It would be fruitless 
for the Social Theorist to vent her scepticism on either 2 or 3, for a being 
which lacked sovereignty over the created world could scarcely count as 
almighty. An almighty being has the ability to bring about a creature without 
the assistance of anyone or anything else, and no creature is independent of 
that being for its existence at even a single moment. So the only way for the 
Social Trinitarian to discredit the Causal Argument and remain faithful to her 
own view is to find something wrong with either 1 or 4. 
II 
As it happens, some Christian theologians may have suggested that the 
Trinity is an exception to premise 4. Consider, for example, this remark by 
Gregory of Nyssa: 
... the action of each[-Father, Son, and Holy Spirit-]concerning anything 
is not separate and peculiar, but whatever comes to pass, in reference either 
to the acts of his providence for us, or to the government and constitution of 
the universe, comes to pass by the action of the Three .... The Holy Trinity 
fulfils every operation in a manner similar to that of which I have spoken, 
not by separate action according to the number of the persons, but so that 
there is one motion and disposition of the good will which is communicated 
from the Father through the Son to the Spirit. . .9 
To be sure, Gregory is not trying to rebut the Causal Argument: he is respond-
ing to the accusation that Christians are compelled to believe in three Gods. 
But whatever the purpose of this passage, and whatever Gregory may have 
meant, it does lucidly express the traditional Trinitarian dictum of omnia 
opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa, and it does at least hint at an inter-
pretation of this dictum which can serve as an intriguing rejoinder to the 
Causal Argument. For we might construe omnia opera Trinitatis to mean that 
whenever the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit wills a particular effect ad 
extra-a particular effect in the created world-all of the members of the 
Trinity will this effect, and the effective volition of anyone of them is 
token-identical to the effective volition of each of the other two. Thus, for 
example, when the Trinity enlightens a human soul with knowledge on a 
particular occasion, the Father's enlightening, the Son's enlightening, and the 
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Spirit's enlightening are not three different act-tokens-they are numerically 
one and the same. And since creating and sustaining creatures counts par 
excellence as acting ad extra, we can extract the following principle from the 
preceding suggestion: 
The Identity Theory [of Divine Creation]. For any volition x, any creature y, 
and any time t: if x is a volition of God the Father, God the Son, or God the 
Holy Spirit and x is causally sufficient for the existence of y at t, then for 
any z, if z is a volition of the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit and z is 
causally necessary for the existence of y at t, then z = x. \0 
We should be careful to envisage this theory clearly, for it is easily confused 
with other principles that are compatible with 4 and which therefore cannot 
be used against the Causal Argument. It is especially important to realise that 
the Identity Theory does not merely claim that many acts of Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit are type-identical-numerically distinct act-tokens of the same 
kind, such as the millions of acts of voting that occur whenever a general 
election is held in Great Britain. The relation which the Identity Theory 
attributes to many acts of the various Trinitarian persons is the most intimate 
relation imaginable: numerical sameness. 
If the Identity Theory is defensible, then it will be easy for the Social 
Trinitarian to parry the Causal Argument. She may concede premises 1, 2, 
and 3; and 5, 6, and 7 follow from these premises and the Social Theory. But 
without 4, the partisan of the Causal Argument is not entitled to 8; and without 
8 he cannot derive a contradiction from Social Trinitarianism. Iff is identical 
to s, then the Social Theory does not violate 1, for this premise does not 
prevent one and the same act-token from being both causally necessary and 
causally sufficient for the same effect-and nor will any other sensible causal 
principle. 
But is the Identity Theory defensible? No matter how coarse-grained a 
criterion for individuating human act-tokens might tolerably be, it is exceed-
ingly implausible to believe that an act-token of one human being is identical 
to an act-token of another. Of course, human beings can perform joint actions. 
But these are not exceptions to 4: for example, Tom's contribution to winning 
a tennis doubles match is not numerically identical with the contribution of 
his partner Jerry. The acts of the Trinity, however, are different from human 
acts in a number of notable respects, and some of these dissimilarities make 
an identity theory of Trinitarian actions seem more credible than an identity 
theory of human actions. Consider two different oboists, each of whom plays 
an A-440. First, we may observe that whereas we can distinguish each of the 
act-tokens of each of the oboists by spatial or temporal location, we cannot use 
these criteria to distinguish the volitions of the Trinity. Even if both oboists are • 
sounding the same pitch at exactly the same moment, neither of them is playing 
at precisely the same place. But obviously, any creative volition of one member 
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of the Trinity which the Identity Theory would want to identify with some 
creative volition of the others will not occur at a different time or place than 
the latter. Traditional theism maintains that neither the Father's, nor the Son's, 
nor the Spirit's willings are located in space; and even if each of these 
volitions is temporal, each occurs at exactly the same time. 
It might be replied that it is nevertheless possible for states of affairs to be 
distinct even though they cannot be distinguished by spatio-temporal loca-
tion. For instance, some philosophers do not ascribe spatiality to mental 
events, and thus cannot use spatio-temporal criteria to distinguish two simul-
taneous occurrent beliefs with exactly the same content-as when a Totten-
ham fan and an Arsenal fan simultaneously acquire a belief that Tottenham 
have just defeated Arsenal. But the Trinitarian can reply that we do resort to 
other criteria to tell these beliefs apart-and these criteria cannot be used 
against the Identity Theory. For example, in typical circumstances, the Tot-
ten ham fan's belief results in delight, whereas the Arsenal fan's belief results 
in disappointment. lI On the other hand, it seems that any Trinitarian act-to-
kens which the Identity Theorist regards as numerically identical have exactly 
the same effects. For nothing has resulted from the Father's work of creation 
that has not also resulted from the Son's and the Spirit's. As Gregory says, 
Yet although we set forth three persons and three names, we do not consider 
that we have had bestowed upon [each one of] us three lives, one from each 
person separately; but the same life is wrought in [each one of] us by the Father, 
and prepared by the Son, and depends upon the will of the Holy Spirit.12 
Furthermore, the Identity Theorist can avail herself of a noteworthy con-
sequence of omnia opera Trinitatis: 
10. For any possible world W, any being x, and any time t, if x is a creature 
and x exists in W, then at least one person in the Trinity wills at t in W 
the existence of x-at-t-in-W if and only if all three persons of the Trinity 
will at t in W the existence of x-at-t-in-W.!3 
And lest anyone object that 10 has been fabricated solely to avert the unwel-
come conclusion of the Causal Argument, and could play no other role in 
Trinitarian theology, the Identity Theorist has a convincing reply: 10 can be 
justified by independent argumentation. In fact, we can do this by modifying 
slightly the second premise of the Causal Argument. 
First, let us assume that whatever is fully divine exists in all possible 
worlds. This assumption, of course, is highly controversial; but at the cost of 
greater complexity our argument could be recast without it. 14 We can then 
change the modality of 2 into necessity de re: 
2n. For any x, if x is divine, then for any possible world Wand any time t in 
W, and for any creature y, if y exists at t in W then x's willing in W that 
y exist-at-t-in-W is causally necessary for the existence of y at t in W. 
364 Faith and Philosophy 
Now suppose that lOis false. Then it is possible that there is a creature who 
exists at a time without all of the members of the Trinity willing its existence-
at-that-time. And that would mean, contrary to 2n, that there is a divine person 
whose volition at that time is not necessary for that creature's existence. 
But 2n is at least worthy of belief. Apart from its intuitive plausibility, a 
number of respectable lines of reasoning converge on it, such as many of the 
modal cosmological arguments for the existence of God. The Identity Theo-
rist is therefore entitled to 10. And with lOin hand, he can draw our attention 
to another significant difference between Trinitarian and human acts. Let us 
return to our example of the two oboists, each of whom is playing an A-440. 
Clearly either of these playings could have existed without the other. And 
that, according to the standard view of identity, gives us a conclusive reason 
for denying that these playings are numerically identical. For on this view, 
identities are metaphysically necessary-if a and b are numerically identical 
at all, they are identical in every possible world in which they exist. Thus, if 
a could have existed without b or vice versa, then a is not even possibly 
identical with b. But according to 10, the divine act-tokens which the Identity 
Theorist considers the same are necessarily coextensive. Now some philoso-
phers have contended that propositions which are logically equivalent-
which are true in exactly the same possible worlds-are numerically 
identical. And though this claim is not unobjectionable, neither is it obviously 
incredible. It can seem reasonable, then, to hold that necessarily coextensive 
act-tokens are numerically identical. And it can seem even more reasonable 
to identify necessarily coextensive act-tokens that do not occur in different 
times or different places and that do not have different effects. 
Briefly put, we can shore up the Identity Theory with a host of appealing, 
traditional theistic claims that enable it to withstand a number of decisive 
objections to an identity theory of human act-tokens. It might therefore appear 
that even Social Trinitarians are entitled to believe the Identity Theory. And 
if that is true, then they have nothing to fear from the Causal Argument. 15 
III 
But the attractiveness of the Identity Theory evaporates under closer scru-
tiny-at the very least, it has consequences that are manifestly unpalatable 
to the traditional Christian. Given one of the two currently plausible concep-
tions of free action, the Identity Theory is patently false; given the other, it 
is incompatible with Christological orthodoxy. 
Philosophers have by no means unanimously accepted a single theory of 
the nature of free action, and so there is more than one way to gloss the Causal 
Argument. But although philosophical disagreements in this area run deep, 
it is generally agreed that at present there are only two conceptions of free 
action with much initial plausibility-the so-called 'Agency Theory,' promi-
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nently advocated by, among others, Thomas Reid, C. A. Campbell, Richard 
Taylor, and Roderick Chisholm; and a rival I shall call the 'Event-Causation 
Theory,' notably defended by Donald Davidson and Alvin Goldman. 16 
Consider first the Agency Theory. According to this view, no agent freely 
brings about x if each of the causes of x is a state of affairs-and that includes 
states of affairs involving the agent herself, such as the agent's own beliefs 
and desires. Nor does an agent freely bring about x if x is uncaused. An agent 
freely brings about x only if one of the causes of x is the agent herself-only 
if, to use the words of some Agency Theorists, x is brought about by 'agent-
causation' or 'immanent causation' rather than being brought about exclu-
sively by 'event-causation' or 'transeunt causation.' The Agency Theory 
enforces a sharp distinction between these two types of causation: agent-cau-
sation is not a form of event-causation, but is sui generis, unique, unanalys-
able. Even a complete list of the states of affairs that are causes of an effect 
brought about by a free act would omit the one factor which makes the effect 
the result of a free act: the agent. 
Now no matter how murky the Agency Theory may be, at least one thing 
is abundantly clear-if we apply this view to divine action, the Identity 
Theory loses its charm. For the way to frame 2 in accordance with the Agency 
Theory is this: 
2a. For any x, if x is divine, then for every creature y and time t, x itself is 
causally necessary for y's existing at t,17 
whereas 3 becomes 
3a. For any x, if x is divine and there exists one or more creatures, then for 
some creature y and time t, x itself is causally sufficient for the existence 
of y at t. 
But then we do not even need 4 in order to deduce a contradiction from the 
Social Theory. For given 3a and 5, 
6a. At some time t, there exists a creature c such that God the Father himself 
is causally sufficient for c's existence at t; 
given 2a, 5, and 6a, 
7a. God the Son himself is causally necessary for c's existence at t; 
and given 1, 5, and 6a, 
8a. God the Son himself is not causally necessary for c's existence at t. 18 
The Agency Theory, however, is not above controversy. More than a few 
philosophers have dismissed it as an account of human action: they have 
maintained that its concept of a 'metaphysical self' which can exercise a 
special kind of causal efficacy is hopelessly obscure, or that it makes the 
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epistemology of singular action statements an inexplicable miracle, or that it 
cannot explain why we attribute free and responsible acts to persons but not 
to non-human animals, or that it cannot explain why we care deeply about 
whether we are capable of acting freely, or that there is no way even in 
principle of knowing whether the Agency Theory is empirically possible-et 
cetera. 19 And some of these objections can be applied to the notion of God 
as an agent-cause. We should therefore consider whether the Identity Theory 
fares any better under an Event-Causation approach to divine action. 
The Event-Causation theorist affirms what the Agency Theory denies-that 
causation by agents is simply a special form of causation by states of affairs. 
Whenever an agent freely brings about an effect, each of the causes of the 
effect is a state of affairs-there are no 'agent-causes' over and above states 
of affairs involving the agent herself. Of course, agents are causes. But they 
exercise their causal efficacy only via their wants, beliefs, intentions, prefer-
ences, and other states of themselves. 
Now an Event-Causation conception of divine action may seem more adept 
at protecting the Social Trinitarian from the Causal Argument. For while no 
act-token of one person of the Trinity can be numerically identical with any 
act-token of another person if each of these persons is a causally efficacious 
'metaphysical self,' it does appear much more plausible to identify the states 
of the Trinitarian persons which are causally responsible for a creature's 
existence. After all, a long and respectable tradition in Christian philosophical 
theology regards all of the standard divine perfections as de re essential 
characteristics of each member of the Trinity: not only are Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect, and so forth, but each 
possesses all of these perfections in every possible world in which he exists. 
And there is a lot that can be said for the following claim: 
I 1. Necessarily, for any x and any y, if x and y essentially possess all of the 
divine perfections, then for any world W, any propositional-attitude type 
A, and any time t: x has a propositional attitude of type A at t in W if and 
only if y has a propositional attitude of type A at t in W. 
(I understand propositional attitudes to be states of mind consisting in some 
sort of stance vis-a-vis a proposition-for example, believing, or hoping, or 
doubting, that there is rational life on other planets. It is not easy to state 
exactly what it is for two propositional-attitude tokens to belong to the same 
type, but for my purposes it is enough to say that two tokens are of the same 
type just in case they both exemplify the same sort of stance-e.g. believing, 
or rejecting, or suspending judgment-toward the same proposition.) Two 
omniscient beings in the same world would not differ in any of their beliefs, 
since each believes every truth and no falsehood. 20 Again, since each member 
of the Trinity is essentially perfectly loving and wise, how could their wills 
possibly conflict? But if we allow the Trinitarian both 11 and the Event-Causation 
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view of divine action, the Identity Theory begins to look viable. Let partisans 
of the Causal Argument choose a propositional attitude of the Father which 
they wish to regard as a cause of a creature's existence at a particular time; 
the Trinitarian may then ascribe a propositional attitude of the same type to 
the Son and the Spirit, and may regard this attitude as a cause of the same 
creature at the same time. And what is to stop even the Social Theorist from 
identifying these attitudes-from considering them one instead of three? 11 
guarantees that the Father's attitude exists in exactly the same possible worlds 
as the Son's and the Spirit's. Moreover, as we have noted, traditional theology 
guarantees that they have exactly the same effects, and that there is no spatial 
or temporal difference between them. But if the Event-Causation Theory is 
correct, what else need we regard as divine causes of creatures apart from 
the propositional attitudes of the persons of the Trinity? It is beginning to 
appear as if this conception of divine action will accommodate the Iden-
tity Theory, and therefore shelter the Social Trinitarian from the Causal 
Argument. 
But given that the Event-Causation theory of divine action is true, the 
traditional Christian is committed to a theological proposition which prevents 
the Trinity from being an exception to 4-the claim that only God the Son, 
and not the Father or the Holy Spirit, became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth. 
For the sake of convenience, let us call the relation of belonging to the same 
person as the relation of copersonality.21 Then according to the orthodox 
doctrine of the Incarnation, God the Son is copersonal with Jesus of Nazareth, 
which implies that all of the states of God the Son are copersonal with a state 
of Jesus of Nazareth. And although not every predicate expresses a genuine 
property, any theory of properties with the slightest plausibility will admit 
that 'being copersonal with a state of Jesus of Nazareth' does. Now states 
which are numerically identical share all of their properties in common. 
Hence, if any state of the Father is numerically identical with some state of 
God the Son, then there is a state of the Father which is copersonal with some 
state of Jesus of Nazareth. But then, of course, the Father is the same person 
as Jesus; or in other words, contrary to received Christian teaching, the Father 
also became incarnate in Jesus. The only way to avoid this unorthodox con-
clusion is to maintain that no state of the Father is copersonal with a state of 
Jesus. However, since each of the states of God the Son is copersonal with a 
state of Jesus, it follows by the Indiscernibility of Identicals that not a single 
state of God the Father is numerically identical with any state of the Son. 
And if 1, 2, and 3 are all true, then the traditional Trinitarian doctrine of 
divine sovereignty cannot be reconciled with the Event-Causation theory of 
divine action-for the Causal Argument will go through. If 3 is true, and 
every state of the Father is distinct from every state of the Son, then there is 
a causal chain leading from the Father to a creature which is sufficient for 
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that creature's existing at t and which contains no state ofthe Son-otherwise, 
the Father's causal activity would not be sufficient for that creature's existing 
at t. But then, given 1, it follows that no causal chain containing a state of 
the Son would be causally necessary for that creature's existing at t, for such 
a chain could not be identical with, or a proper part of, the causal chain 
leading from the Father to the creature. 
The foregoing discussion of the Identi ty Theory has necessitated a welcome 
clarification of the relation that must exist on a Social Trinitarian view be-
tween the ad extra acts of the different members of the Trinity. Although 
virtually every Social Trinitarian has asserted that omnia opera Trinitatis ad 
extra sunt indivisa, few of them have distinguished between the Identity 
Theory and the weaker claim that the ad extra acts of the Trinity are type-
identical. 22 It might be thought that the Trinitarian owes no-one any obligation 
to keep these claims distinct, for it might be supposed that nothing of any 
importance hinges on the fate of the Identity Theory. Only those with an 
inordinate fondness for counting entities should care about whether the ad 
extra acts of the Trinity are one or three-the rest of us can safely ignore this 
question. But that is emphatically not the case. If the Identity Theory were 
serviceable, it would foil an impressive argument against Social Trinitarian-
ism. But this theory is not serviceable-and therefore the Social Trinitarian 
must learn how to live without it. If orthodox Christology is to be believed, 
then whatever the divine causes of creatures-be it the special agent-causality 
of the individual persons or their mental states-the Father's causal activity 
is not numerically identical with the Son's, and neither the Son's nor the 
Father's is numerically identical with the Spirit's. Since the theological com-
mitments of the traditionally-minded Social Trinitarian prevent her from cast-
ing aspersions on 2, 3, or 4, she can only rebut the Causal Argument by 
discrediting its first premise. Can she? 
IV 
It seems not. As we noted earlier, it appears obvious that 1 is a necessary 
truth. Never mind that philosophers vigorously disagree about the nature of 
causal necessity and causal sufficiency-that some regard causal necessity, 
for example, as a kind of counterfactual dependence, some as suppressibility 
by the interference of agents, others as necessary conditionship, yet others as 
statistical relevance, and still others as unanalysable. And never mind that 
proponents of the Causal Argument do not specify what they mean by causal 
necessity and causal sufficiency. For it looks as if 1 will come out true no 
matter what theories of causal concepts turn out to be satisfactory. How could 
one state of affairs be causally necessary for an effect if a distinct and simul-
taneous state of affairs is causally sufficient for that same effect? 
But in this case, as in so many others, appearances are deceiving: 1 is not 
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at all as obvious as it may seem. We can sketch an account of divine causal 
necessity and sufficiency which not only deserves serious consideration, but 
also casts grave suspicions on the plausibility of 1. I will not be able to argue 
that this account is reasonable and that it is incompatible with 1, so I will not 
be able to prove that the Social Trinitarian can justifiably reject the Causal 
Argument. But I think I will be able to mount a strong challenge to advocates 
of this argument-they will need to show what is wrong with my reply if 
they wish to continue maintaining that their argument discredits the Social 
Theory of the Trinity. 
I would prefer to block the Causal Argument by developing a well-moti-
vated, defensible general analysis of causal necessity and sufficiency 'from 
the ground up'-a general definition of these concepts that does not presup-
pose any unanalysed causal notions-and then showing that on this analysis, 
it is possible for each of the simultaneous volitions of each of the members 
of the Trinity to be causally necessary and yet also causally sufficient for the 
existence of one and the same creature at one and the same time. This would 
constitute as decisive a refutation of the Causal Argument as the Social 
Trinitarian could hope for. But this would also require much more space than 
I am permitted, and much more resourcefulness than I can command. Since 
the rekindling of interest a generation ago in the analysis of singular causal 
statements, it has proved notoriously difficult to come up with a theory of 
causation that is demonstrably adequate-each attempt has provoked formi-
dable objections to its tenability. Granted, one does not have to find an 
adequate theory of causality in order to deal a considerable blow to the Causal 
Argument-it would be enough to show that every account of causation taken 
seriously at present will produce a definition of divine causal necessity and 
sufficiency which permits each of the members of the Trinity to be sovereign. 
But even this is too involved to attempt here. How unfortunate that the 
Identity Theory of Divine Creation does not work-if only it did, the Social 
Trinitarian could ignore the tortuous question of the nature of causality, since 
she could dispense with the Causal Argument simply by disproving 4. But, 
as Bernard Williams has said in another context, there is no road back from 
reflectiveness. 
On the other hand, I do not think it self-evident that the Social Trinitarian 
must delve into general accounts of causality in order to show that 1 is rather 
questionable. What if she begins instead by taking as primitive the concept 
of divine ad extra causation-specifically, the notion that a divine being 
brings about states of affairs in the created world by the exercise of its 
agency-and presuming that this concept is at least prima facie free from 
insurmountable difficulties? Suppose we once again conveniently assume 
a volitional theory of action. Then what is obviously and irremediably 
defective with the claim that a being with the divine attributes literally 
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has volitions-willings that such-and-such a state of affairs occur-and these 
volitions cause states of affairs that satisfy their propositional content-for 
example, the divine volition that Eve exist-at-t brings about the existence of 
Eve at t? 
Granted, a number of well-known theories of causality would logically rule 
out this claim. One example is the mechanistic account, which maintains that 
states of affairs cannot be causally related unless they are spatio-temporally 
contiguous. Another is the standard Humean theory, which insists that states 
of affairs can be causally related only if they can be subsumed under a 
contingent empirical law. Moreover, philosophers and theologians have often 
argued that traditional theology is compelled to saddle God with properties 
that are logically incompatible with acting in the world-such as timeless-
ness, or immutability. But theories of causality that are inconsistent with 
divine ad extra causation are anything but indubitable. And even if Christians 
cannot remain orthodox unless they ascribe such properties as immutability 
or timelessness to a divine being, it is very much an open question whether 
these properties logically prevent an agent from bringing about effects in the 
created world.23 
The Social Trinitarian, then, is permitted to suppose in the absence of 
further evidence that there are no flagrant problems with the concept of divine 
ad extra causation: even though God's bringing about the existence of a 
creature is enormously different from a human being's bringing about the 
existence of something, the two relations have enough in common for it to 
be at least initially reasonable to regard the former as a genuine case of 
causation. Naturally, more would have to be done to show that the notion of 
divine ad extra causation is intellectually respectable. But since so many 
attempts to prove otherwise have failed, it would be peremptory to prohibit 
the Social Trinitarian from using this notion to fashion a reply to the Causal 
Argument. Whatever conceptual problems may plague the idea of divine 
causation in the world, they are by no means as egregious as the conceptual 
problems which plague the idea that numbers, propositions, and other Pla-
tonica are capable of efficient causality. Furthermore, there is much we can 
do to characterise the relation of divine ad extra causation even if we do not 
attempt to analyse it from the ground up-we can point out that this relation 
is necessarily irreflexive and necessarily asymmetrical, that it supports coun-
terfactuals such as 'If God had not willed that Eve exist-at-t, Eve would not 
have existed at t,' and so forth. I shall therefore take as primitive the notion 
of divine ad extra causation, and shall suppose not only that it is prima facie 
legitimate, but also that we understand it well enough to use it to fill out the 
analyses of divine causal relations which I shall now present. 
I begin with the analysis of divine causal necessity-an analysis clearly 
inspired by counterfactual theories of causal dependence: 
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12. For any states of affairs x and y and any possible world W, if x and y 
obtain in Wand x is a divine volition that y obtain-in-W, then x is 
causally necessary in W for y's obtaining-in-W if and only if it is true 
in W that if x had not obtained, y would not have obtained. 
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This analysis, in conjunction with principles to which the Social Trinitarian 
is firmly committed, has at least two consequences which are much to be 
desired by traditional Christians. The first is jointly entailed by 12 and 2: for 
every x, every y, and every time t, if x is a member of the Trinity, y is a 
creature, and y exists at t, y would not have existed at t if x had not willed 
at t that y exist-at-t. The second is that whenever the volition of one member 
of the Trinity at t is causally necessary for a creature's existence at t, each of 
the corresponding volitions of the other members of the Trinity at t is also 
causally necessary for that creature's existence at t. For according to every 
credible semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the following inference is 
deductively valid: 
I-I. If p had not been the case, then q would not have been the case; 
p is logically equivalent to r-that is, p and r are true in exactly the 
same possible worlds; 
therefore, if r had not been the case, q would not have been the case. 
Since 1-1 is valid, so is any instance of it, including the following argument-
form: 
1-2. If Trinitarian person P had not willed at t the existence of creature c-at-t, 
then c would not have existed at t; 
p's willing at t the existence of c-at-t is logically equivalent to Trinitarian 
person Q's willing at t the existence of c-at-t; 
therefore, if Q had not willed at t the existence of c-at-t, c would not 
have existed at t. 
And since 1-2 is also valid, any instance of it is also valid, no matter which 
Trinitarian names we substitute for 'P' and for 'Q,' and no matter which 
creaturely name we substitute for 'c.' But any instance of the first premise 
of 1-2 will be jointly entailed by Social Trinitarianism, 2, and 12. And any 
instance of the second premise of 1-2 is a consequence of 10, which, as we 
have seen, the Social Trinitarian is fully entitled to believe. 
Of course, general counterfactual theories of causality face several impos-
ing difficulties, notably the problem of distinguishing genuinely causal from 
merely logical relations of dependence. But of course, 12 does not try to 
define divine causal sufficiency without presupposing any causal notions, so 
12 does not try to distinguish genuinely causal divine sufficiency from other 
forms of divine sufficiency. It may be helpful at this point to recall Saul 
Kripke's memorable remarks against those who raise sceptical doubts about 
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the possibility of trans-world identification of individuals. As Kripke notes, 
these doubts often arise from talking of possible worlds as if they were distant 
and unfamiliar places we must view through a special kind of telescope, so 
that first we see objects in other possible worlds which look somewhat similar 
to objects in our own world, and then we agonise over whether the objects 
in the other worlds are identical to any objects in our own. But this sort of 
talk is patently ridiculous. And it is just as ridiculous to fancy that once the 
Social Trinitarian stipulates that a possible world contains both a creature c 
which exists at t and a divine volition that c exist-at-t, we have to peer at that 
world through a telescope to ascertain whether the divine volition brings 
about the existence of c-at-t. Given such a divine volition and such a state of 
affairs, it follows that the volition is an efficient cause of the state. 12, then, 
merely tells us what needs to be added to this causal relation in order for the 
divine volition to be causally necessary for the state. 
However, 12 does invite an objection that the Social Trinitarian cannot 
brush aside so easily: even if a divine ad extra volition and a state of affairs 
satisfying its propositional content are related in the way specified by 12, and 
this relation counts as causality, it still does not count as causal necessity. 
Since this objection is too troublesome for a summary dismissal, I shall have 
to leave it for another occasion. Nonetheless, the Social Trinitarian can say 
much in her defence. For instance, she can quite easily distinguish divine 
creation and preservation from many kinds of counterexamples to the suffi-
ciency of various counterfactual analyses of causal necessity. In the divine 
case, the volition that a creature exist is not a constituent part of the creature's 
existing; in the divine case, God does not do one action by doing another, 
because the state of affairs that is counterfactually dependent upon the divine 
willing is not even an action; and given at least a rudimentary understanding 
of divine ad extra causation, we need not worry about disambiguating the 
direction of causation-it is simply analytic that a divine volition is causally 
prior to a state of affairs that satisfies the propositional content of the volition. 
Furthermore, perhaps the Social Trinitarian can also say that in cases in which 
it is evident to naive intuition that neither of two simultaneous causes of a 
state of affairs is causally necessary for that state, the effect is not counter-
factually dependent on either of its causes, whereas the existence of a creature 
at a time, as we have seen, is counterfactually dependent upon each of the 
relevant volitions of each of the persons in the Trinity. In the switch case 
mentioned earlier, for example, it is not true of either switch that if it had not 
been flipped, the light would not have come on, because according to the 
usual comparative-similarity semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the 
light comes on in those possible worlds closest to the actual world in which 
one of the switches is not flipped. And perhaps this could help to justify the 
Social Trinitarian's conviction that each of the relevant Trinitarian volitions 
is causally necessary for the existence of a creature.24 
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As for divine causal sufficiency, my analysis is reminiscent of the neo-
Humean regularity theory, which contends that one state of affairs is causally 
sufficient for another just in case the obtaining of the first state, in conjunc-
tion with the laws of nature, entails the obtaining of the second, but neither 
the obtaining of the first state nor the laws of nature alone entail the obtaining 
of the second. Of course, the regularity theory will not do as it stands for an 
analysis of divine causal sufficiency, since it would imply that a divine vo-
lition by itself cannot be causally sufficient for anything. But we can over-
come this problem once we are allowed to use our unanalysed concept of 
divine ad extra causality: we can maintain that what makes a case of divine 
causality into a case of divine sufficient causation is simply that the di vine 
volition entails that its effect obtains, so that God's causal sufficiency is not 
subject to the laws of nature. In other words, 
13. For any states of affairs x and y and any possible world W, if x and y 
obtain in Wand x is a divine volition that y obtain-in-W, then x is 
causally sufficient for y in W if and only if there is no possible world 
in which x obtains but y does not obtain. 
This principle follows from a claim that is endorsed by a great many 
traditional theists-that it is a de re essential property of any individual that 
is divine that its will is unimpedable, i.e. it is not possible for it to will a state 
of affairs without that state's coming to pass. And 13, like 12, entails, in 
conjunction with other central beliefs of Social Trinitarianism, a consequence 
that traditional Christians will welcome: it logically guarantees that if one 
member of the Trinity has a volition at t which is causally sufficient for the 
existence of a creature at t, then the other two members of the Trinity will 
each have a volition at t which is also causally sufficient for the existence of 
that creature at t. For necessarily, given any states of affairs x, y, and z, if x 
entails y and z is necessarily coextensive with x, then z also entails x. And 
according to 10, it is a necessary truth that, for any volition of a Trinitarian 
person at a time t which entails the existence of a creature at t, there is a 
volition of each of the other Trinitarian persons at t which also entails the 
existence of that creature at t. 
And if 12 and 13 are both acceptable, then 1 is, at the very least, question-
able. For it is scarcely axiomatic that one and the same state of affairs cannot 
be both individually entailed by each of two other states of affairs and also 
counterfactually dependent upon each of them. In fact, according to one 
respected criterion for the individuation of states of affairs, there are many 
such states which obtain in the actual world. For instance, the number of my 
eyes being 2, the number of my eyes being the smallest even positive integer, 
and the number of my eyes being the smallest positive prime number are all 
distinct states of affairs, yet the first is both entailed by and counterfactually 
dependent upon the second, and is both entailed by and counterfactually 
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dependent upon the third. Now of course this criterion is disputable; and even 
if it were not, the relations of entailment and counterfactual dependence 
between these states of affairs, unlike the dependence of creatures on God, 
are symmetrical. But why should this worry the Social Trinitarian? It may 
well mean that Trinitarian causation of creatures is unique in this respect-but 
what is wrong with that? Why should we believe that a state of affairs cannot 
be both asymmetrically entailed by each of two other states of affairs and 
also asymmetrically counterfactually dependent on each of them? Hence, 
contrary to what proponents of the Causal Argument have heretofore sup-
posed, 1 cannot be effortlessly extracted from our concepts of causal neces-
sity and causal sufficiency. 
This completes my reply to the Causal Argument. I concede that I have not 
refuted it. But I think I have cast considerable doubt on its cogency. Those 
who believe in it must explain why the Social Trinitarian is not entitled to 
12 and 13-or why 1 is plausible even if she is. If no such explanation can 
be given, then she may safely repudiate the Causal Argument: if there be any 
convincing reasons for denying the coherence of her claim that there is more 
than one God who exercises sovereign power over the created world, these 
reasons will not arise from any account of causal necessity and sufficiency 
that we are obliged to believe. If these concepts will not forbid us to say, 
There be one Lord, they will not forbid us to say, There be more than one. 25 
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